Traditionally clinicians have determined their patients' resuscitation status without consultation. This has been condemned as morally indefensible in cases where notfor resuscitation (NFR) orders are based on quality of life considerations and when the patient's true wishes are not known. Such instances would encompass most resuscitation decisions in elderly patients.
Introduction
In recent guidelines on withholding cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR), Doyal and Wilsher draw attention to the potential clash between respect for individual autonomy and a tradition of clinical discretion which continues to deprive patients of any knowledge of their CPR status. ' They propose that informed consent must be obtained in the case of patients where CPR is withheld on grounds other than futility, and in cases where the clinicians do not know the true wishes of the patients.
Generally when patients are admitted to hospital they are understood to be for resuscitation as part of Key words CPR decision-making; informed consent; autonomy. a duty of care unless otherwise explicitly stated. In young patients, withholding resuscitation is largely based on the chances of successful outcome being negligible, that is to say of CPR being considered futile. In America such patients are required to provide informed consent to their do not resuscitate (DNR) orders, but in this country it has been stated that consent is neither morally nor legally required under such circumstances.'
In geriatric medicine it is relatively uncommon for non-resuscitation decisions to be made on the basis of futility. Most are based on a variety of considerations such as frailty, disability, extreme old age and multiple pathology, all of which may reduce the likelihood of successful outcome but would not necessarily predict failure with certainty. 2 This allows discretionary space for clinicians to decide, on the basis oftheir own values and principles, that resuscitation is not in the patient's interest. Such decisions may be based on the perceived poor quality of life before resuscitation, or the expected poor quality of life after resuscitation.
Further, both for this group of patients and for those for whom resuscitation may be considered a reasonable option, no clinician can be said to know a patient's true wishes without consultation with the individual concerned.
There has been a burgeoning number of studies which have supported the participation of elderly patients in CPR decision-making. Such studies have been questionnaire-based and have sought to assess patients' attitudes regarding their resuscitation preferences. These studies have shown that most patients want to be consulted regarding CPR decision-making, most desire CPR,3`most are not disturbed by the consultation,57 and many want to make their own decisions.
However, none of the studies has indicated whether the patients' preferences had been used in any way in This means that the heart stops beating and, as no blood is pumped around the body, death occurs. In hospitals we usually try to start the heart up again by using various techniques", and described were cardiac massage, bag mask ventilation, drug therapy and defibrillation. "In about one out of ten cases of cardiac arrest we manage to start the heart up again. The procedure itself may have complications such as broken ribs and sometimes brain damage. I would like to ask you whether you would like us to try and start the heart up again if you had a cardiac arrest?"
The patients were reassured that this was not expected in their case but that their opinion was important in letting us know what they wanted done for them and that we would abide by it.
The HAD testing was done two or three days later.
One week after the initial interview the patients were approached by one of us (IS) who obtained informed consent in order to discuss with them the reasons for their CPR decision and their recall of the information provided by MA. These interviews were taped. The patients were asked whether they remembered discussing CPR with the doctor, what was said, what they decided, the reasons for their decision and whether they still stood by their decision.
Results
Nineteen patients entered the study, 14 SW said "The doctor told me about brain damage and I think that where there's life there's hope. The brain damage is a minimal risk and with a lot of people, they would rather have an old person who is with them even in an institution or hospital where they could visit. They've still got that time with them. I think some may think they are better off dead, but most people would want it." Discussion Most British studies, although asking patients for their resuscitation preference, do not specify whether this preference was used in decision-making or whether the patients were necessarily aware that they were deciding on their own outcome.
One study, in which 92% of the patients wanted CPR, attributed this to the fact that the patients were not considering their circumstances to be hypothetical.9 Yet this study, after broadly informing the patients about CPR, without indicating the chances of success, obtained the data by asking four questions dealing with general issues pertaining to CPR and a fifth question asking "Would you wish CPR if you had a cardiac arrest?" These patients, in keeping with the other studies, were happy to discuss their views. The authors do not indicate whether they acted on the patients' wishes.
In our study all except one patient indicated their CPR preference and none seemed upset at the time of questioning. However, one week later six patients appeared to have been distressed by the decisionmaking, two patients in an unequivocal fashion. Four patients had no recollection of the discussion regarding CPR although two continued to express a wish for active intervention.
Difficulties with recollection
In a paper by Schade and Muslin,'3 in which resuscitation was thought to be a hopeless option, six patients who were asked to consent to NFR orders became disturbed. In three of the patients there were difficulties with recollection or processing of the information given. Some of our patients' responses were similar in this respect, suggesting psychological harm.
An explanation for the distress invoked by asking patients to determine their own resuscitation status, which is not apparent in the questionnaire-based studies, might be the immediacy of the possibility of cardiac arrest for this patient group. In the large group studies the patients were being canvassed regarding their views, and the inclusion of their CPR preference amongst a wide variety of issues relating to It is a pity that elderly patients have served as the focus of this debate. This is because they are in a number of senses a vulnerable patient population. They are often chronically ill and suffer from a significant degree of unrecognised depression. Although our measures of cognitive function exclude obvious dementing disease, they do not reflect subtle memory and judgment failure and the poor educational opportunities experienced by some people born at the beginning of this century.
On the other hand this is the population in whom it appears some people would not wish for CPR whatever the outcome, and in whom CPR has poorer prospects of success, particularly when viewed against a background of general debility and multiple pathology.
Loewy points out that forcing patients to make a choice in a situation in which they would prefer not to choose, is not an exercise in autonomy, rather another type of paternalism.'4 On the basis of respecting the wishes of those patients who would not want to be involved in such decision-making, perhaps some form of invitation might be provided to those entering the hospital. This would explain the existence of a resuscitation policy, and offer them the opportunity to discuss it with their doctor if they want to be instrumental in determining their own resuscitation status.
Although an obvious limitation to this study is the small number of patients entered, we believe these patients to be representative of apparently cognitively intact elderly individuals who might be thought capable of participating in their own decision-making regarding CPR.
Our results prove contrary, both in highlighting the faulty reasoning employed by some patients, and in demonstrating psychological pain which has been said to be the only justification for paternalism in these circumstances. We suggest further work directed at identifying those patients who want to be involved in determining their own CPR status, and how best to inform them, before approaching mentally alert patients (as Mead and Turnbull have proposed) in order to identify in advance those who would not desire CPR in the event of a cardiac arrest.3
